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.That fearcould generate a regional anti-Chinese coalition (and some overtones of that are already present in the nascentIndonesian-Australian military cooperation), which would then most likely seek support from the United States,Japan, and Australia.A Greater China, especially after digesting Hong Kong, will almost certainly seek more energetically toachieve Taiwan's reunification with the mainland.It is important to appreciate the fact that China has neveracquiesced in the indefinite separation of Taiwan.Therefore, at some point, that issue could generate a head-onAmerican-Chinese collision.Its consequences for all concerned would be most damaging: China's economicprospects would be set back; America's ties with Japan could become severely strained; and American efforts tocreate a stable balance of power in eastern Eurasia could be derailed.Accordingly, it is essential to attain and maintain reciprocally the utmost clarity on this issue.Even if for theforeseeable future China is likely to lack the means to effectively coerce Taiwan, Beijing must understand andbe credibly convinced that American acquiescence in an attempt at the forcible reintegration of Taiwan,sought by the use of military power, would be so devastating to America's position in the Far East that Americasimply could notafford to remain militarily passive; if Taiwan were unable to protect itself.In other words, America would have to intervene not for the sake of a separate Taiwan but for the sake ofAmerica's geopolitical interests in the Asia-Pacific area.This is an important distinction.The United Statesdoes not have, per se, any special interest in a separate Taiwan.In fact, its official position has been, and shouldremain, that there is only one China.But how China seeks reunification can impinge on vital Americaninterests, and the Chinese have to be clearly aware of that.The issue of Taiwan also gives America a legitimate reason for raising the human rights question in itsdealings with China without justifying the accusation of interference in Chinese domestic affairs.It is perfectlyappropriate to reiterate to Beijing that reunification will be accomplished only when China becomes moreprosperous and more democratic.Only such a China will be able to attract Taiwan and assimilate it within aGreater China that is also prepared to be a confederation based on the principle of "one country, severalsystems." In any case, because of Taiwan, it is in China's own interest to enhance respect for human rights, andit is appropriate in that context for America to address the matter.At the same time, it behooves the United States in keeping with its promise to China to abstain fromdirectly or indirectly supporting any international upgrading of Taiwan's status.In the 1990s, some U.S.-Taiwanese official contacts conveyed the impression that the United States was tacitly beginning to treatTaiwan as a separate state, and the Chinese anger over this issue was understandable, as was Chineseresentment of the intensifying effort by Taiwanese officials to gain international recognition for Taiwan'sseparate status.The United States should not be shy, therefore, in making it clear that its attitude toward Taiwan will beadversely affected by Taiwanese efforts to alter the long-established and deliberate ambiguities governing theChina-Taiwan relationship.Moreover, if China does prosper and does democratize and if its absorption ofHong Kong does not involve a retrogression regarding civil rights, American encouragement of a serious cross- Strait dialogue regarding the terms of an eventual reunification would also help generate pressure for increaseddemocratization within China, while fostering a wider strategic accommodation between the United States anda Greater China.Korea, the geopolitically pivotal state in Northeast Asia, could again become a source of contention betweenAmerica and China, and its future will also impact directly on the American-Japanese connection.As long asKorea remains divided and potentially vulnerable to a war between the unstable North and the increasingly richSouth, American forces will have to remain on the peninsula.Any unilateral U.S.withdrawal would not only belikely to precipitate a new war but would, in all probability, also signal the end of the American militarypresence in Japan.It is difficult to conceive of the Japanese continuing to rely on continued U.S.deployment onJapanese soil in the wake of an American abandonment of South Korea.Rapid Japanese rearmament would bethe most likely consequence, with broadly destabilizing consequences in the region as a whole.Korea's reunification, however, would also be likely to pose serious geopolitical dilemmas.If Americanforces were to remain in a reunified Korea, they would inevitably be viewed by the Chinese as pointed againstChina.In fact, it is doubtful that the Chinese would acquiesce in reunification under these circumstances.If thatreunification were taking place by stages, involving a so-called soft landing, China would obstruct it politicallyand support those elements in North Korea that remained opposed to reunification.If that reunification weretaking place violently, with North Korea "crash landing," even Chinese military intervention could not beprecluded.From the Chinese perspective, a reunified Korea would be acceptable only if it is not simultaneouslya direct extension of American power (with Japan in the background as its springboard).However, a reunified Korea without U.S.troops on its soil would be quite likely to gravitate first toward aform of neutrality between China and Japan and then gradually driven in part by residual but still intense anti-Japanese feelings toward a Chinese sphere of either politically more assertive influence or somewhat moredelicate deference.The issue would then arise as to whether Japan would still be willing to serve as the onlyAsian base for American power.At the very least, the issue would be most divisive within Japanese domesticpolitics.Any resulting retraction in the scope of U.S.military reach in the Far East would in turn make themaintenance of a stable Eurasian balance of power more difficult.These considerations thus enhance theAmerican and Japanese stakes in the Korean status quo (though in each case, for somewhat different reasons),and if that status quo is to be altered, it must occur in very slow stages, preferably in a setting of a deepeningAmerican-Chinese regional accommodation.In the meantime, a true Japanese-Korean reconciliation would contribute significantly to a more stableregional setting for any eventual reunification.The various international complications that could ensue fromKorean reintegration would be mitigated by a genuine reconciliation between Japan and Korea, resulting in anincreasingly cooperative and binding political relationship between these two countries.The United Statescould play the critical role in promoting that reconciliation
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Tematy
IndexChoroby zakaŸne zwierzšt domowych z elementami ZOONOZ pod red. Stanisława Winiarczyka i Zbigniewa Gršdzkiego
Domino Zbigniew Syberiada polska 3 Tajga. Tamtego lata w Kajenie
PS00 Nienacki Zbigniew Pierwsza przygoda Pana Samochodzika
Cyfrowe sterowanie maszynami asynchronicznymi Zbigniew Krzemiński [MONOGRAFIA]
PS09 Zbigniew Nienacki Pan Samochodzik i Dziwne szachownice
PS15 Nienacki Zbigniew Pan Samochodzik i Nieuchwytny Kolekcjoner
PS01 Nienacki Zbigniew Pan Samochodzik i skarb Atanaryka
Nienacki Zbigniew 1983 Raz w roku w Skirolawkach
Nienacki Zbigniew 16 Pan Samochodzik i Nieuchwytny kolekcjoner
Zbigniew Chšdzyński Wspomnienia powstańca z lat 1861 1863