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.Weshould say not that the absence of a referent brings with it the absence of a correlate for the statement, but that it is thecorrelate of the statement  that to which it refers, not only what is said, but also what it speaks of, its 'theme'  whichmakes it possible to say whether or not the proposition has a referent: it alone decides this in a definitive way.Let ussuppose in fact that the formulation 'The golden mountain is in California' is found not in a geography book, nor in atravel book, but in a novel, or in some fictional context or other, one could still accord it a value of truth or error(according to whether the imaginary world to which it refers does or does not authorize such a geological and geo-graphical fantasy).We must know to what the statement refers, what is its space of correlations, if we are to say whethera proposition has or has not a referent.'The present king of France is bald' lacks a referent only if one supposes that thestatement refers to the world of con-temporary historical information.The relation of the proposition to the referentcannot serve as a model or as a law for the relation of the statement to what it states.The latter relation not only does notbelong to the same level as the former, but it is anterior to it.Nor is it superposable to the relation that may exist between a sentence and its meaning.The gap between these twoforms of relation appears clearly in the case of two famous sentences that are meaning-less, in spite of their perfectlycorrect grammatical structure (as in the example: 'Colourless green ideas sleep furiously').In fact, to say that a sentencelike this is meaningless presupposes that one has already excluded a number of possibilities  that it describes a dream,that it is part of a poetic text, that it is a coded message, that it is spoken by a((102))drug addict  and that one assumes it to be a certain type of statements that must refer, in a very definite way, to somevisible reality.The relation of a sentence with its meaning resides within a specific, well-stabilized enunciative relation.Moreover, even if these sentences are taken at an enunciative level at which they are meaningless, they are not, asstatements, deprived of correlations: there are those that enable one to say, for example, that ideas are never eithercoloured or colour-less, and therefore that the sentence is meaningless (and these correlations concern a level of reality inwhich ideas are invisible, and in which colours can he seen, etc.); there are also those correlations that validate thesentence in question as a mention of a type of correct syntactical organization that was also meaningless (and thesecorrelations concern the level of the language (langue), with its laws and properties).A sentence cannot be non-significant; it refers to something, by virtue of the fact that it is a statement.How, then, can we define this relation that characterizes the state-ment as statement  a relation that seems to beimplicitly presupposed by the sentence or the proposition, and which is anterior to it? How can we disentangle it fromthose relations of meaning or those values of truth, with which it is usually confused? Any statement, as simple astatement as one can imagine, does not have as its correlate an individual or a particular object that is designated by thisor that word in the sentence: in the case of a statement like `The golden mountain is in California', the correlate is not theformation, real or imaginary, possible or absurd, that is designated by the nominal syntagma that serves as the subject.But nor is the correlate of the statement a state of things or a relation capable of verifying the proposition (in the examplechosen, this would be the spatial inclusion of a particular mountain in a particular region) [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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