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.According to the  2207 report issued in April 2005, the Administrationhas made available $218 million in FY2005 funds for the  Commander s EmergencyResponse Program (CERP), and the FY2005 supplemental appropriation (P.L.109-13) provides the requested $320 million in additional FY2005 CERP funds.A similar program began in October 2004, called the Commander sHumanitarian Relief and Reconstruction Projects (CHHRP).About $86 million wasallocated for this program from the FY2004 supplemental appropriation.Thesefunds are for small projects mainly in restive Sunni towns such as Ramadi andSamarra, but also in the Kurdish areas.Abu Ghraib Prison Abuses.U.S.efforts to calm ongoing violence werecomplicated somewhat by revelations in early May 2004 that U.S.military personnelhad abused prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad.4949For information on this issue, CRS Report RL32395, U.S.Treatment of Prisoners inIraq: Selected Legal Issues, by Jennifer Elsea. CRS-31Other Programs and Options to Stabilize Iraq/ Exit StrategyThe Bush Administration cites the relatively successful elections and theformation of a new government to assert that existing transition plans will lead tostability and democracy.However, Administration concerns before the elections hadprompted the January 2005 mission of Gen.Gary Luck to Iraq to conduct a broadreview of U.S.operations, with particular attention to the training of Iraqi securityforces.He reportedly made recommendations, some of which have become publicand are discussed below, to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld in January 2005.TheWashington Post reported on February 15, 2005 that Secretary of State Rice had sentin a separate State Department team to assess how U.S.officials might adjust to newleaders in Baghdad.Building Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).50 The thrust of U.S.policy is toequip and train Iraqi security forces (ISF) that could secure Iraq by themselves andenable U.S.forces to draw down.The conference report on the FY2005supplemental appropriation (P.L.109-13) requires an Administration report toCongress on the status of securing Iraq, particularly the building of the ISF.The Department of Defense reports that, as of May 9, 2005, there are about162,800  trained and equipped members of the ISF  about 74,700 military forcesunder Iraq s Ministry of Defense and about 88,000 police/lighter forces under theMinistry of Interior.They are organized into 52  Army (Army and other forcesunder Defense Ministry) and 44  police (police and other forces under InteriorMinistry) battalions.The force is approaching the 271,000 goal set for July 2006.However, there are varying definitions and assessments of ISF size; in February 3,2005, Senate testimony, Joint Chiefs Chairman Myers said that, of that total number,only about 40,000 (about one third) are fully capable of deploying anywhere in Iraq.In addition, the police-related component of the ISF totals include possibly tens ofthousands (according to the GAO on March 15, 2005) who are absent-without-leaveand might have deserted.The police generally live with their families, rather than inbarracks, and are therefore hard to account for.After the January 30 elections, senior U.S.military leaders praised theperformance and tenacity of the ISF, noting that, on election day, some ISF put theirlives on the line to protect voters and polling stations.U.S.commanders say that theelection has spurred recruitment for the ISF, and they cite several operations led byvarious ISF units during March 2005 as evidence of their growing confidence.Theseoperations include a raid on an insurgent encampment north of Baghdad that ISFofficials say killed over 80 insurgents.The praise contrasted with statements beforethe elections, such as Gen.Abizaid s December 2004 comment that the ISF  just arenot there yet in their ability to secure Iraq.On December 20, 2004, President Bushdescribed their performance as  mixed. Other U.S.commanders noted that the ISFlacked an effective command structure, and that ISF forces had often failed or refusedon their own to forcefully combat the insurgency.Some U.S.military personnel toldjournalists that they are penetrated by insurgents.In one notable example, about50For additional information, see CRS Report RS22093.Iraq s New Security Forces: theChallenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences. CRS-32three quarters of the 4,000-person police force in Mosul collapsed in the face of aninsurgent uprising there in November 2004 [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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