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.This is true in the literal sense, but Hookerwanted to use French s force as part of the wing he intended tothrow across Lee s line of communication in the Cumberland Val-ley, and Halleck considered this plan too bold and risky for Hookerto carry out.That appears to have been the real point at issue be-tween Hooker and Halleck.A few days later Halleck readily agreedto Meade s withdrawing most of French s force from Harpers Ferryand using these units to guard the army s rear.Hooker elaborated at some length on his plan to sever Lee s com-munications in his testimony before the Congressional Joint Com-mittee on the Conduct of the War.24 Hooker stated that his order to opening moves of the campaign 31the Twelfth Corps on June 27 was his second effort to begin such amovement, and only his dismissal from command prevented a suc-cessful execution of the plan.He continued to place great emphasison the need to join the Harpers Ferry garrison to this movementand reported that, had he been allowed to follow through, I hada great deal of confidence that Lee s army would be thoroughlywhipped, if I could not say destroyed. 25Meade Assumes CommandMeade appears to have known nothing of Hooker s offensive plan,and the forward wing never penetrated in force into the Cum-berland Valley or got closer to Lee s rear than the passes in SouthMountain toward the northern end of the valley (see map 1).Meadewanted the army more tightly concentrated and pulled this forwardwing east and north of its initial positions.The tactical disposition of the various corps was excellent (theplan seems to have been prepared by General Butterfield, who hadcontinued as chief of staff), far enough apart to avoid congestionon the roads, but close enough to provide support in case of a sud-den fight.But they were essentially defensive dispositions.Meadewas shadowing Lee, but he was not thinking offensively.Indeed, hestarted looking behind the army for likely places to make a defen-sive stand should Lee attack, and he settled on Pipe Creek, sometwenty miles east of the designated rally point at Emmitsburg.On June 28 he announced: I propose to move this army tomor-row in the direction of York. 26 The Union army then moved north-ward, with two corps (the First and the Eleventh) moving throughEmmitsburg, three other corps (the Second, Third, and Twelfth)moving toward Taneytown, some twenty miles to the east, and an-other two corps (the Fifth and Seventh) moving still farther to theeast toward Manchester and Union Mills.The cavalry corps underPleasanton now had three divisions.Gen.Judson Kilpatrick (whohad replaced Stahel) moved from his original position with the ad-vance wing on the left flank to a screening position on the right 32 opening moves of the campaignfront of the advance, while John Buford moved to screen on the leftflank.David Gregg, with the Third Division, was to guard the rearof the army.Buford knew Lee s main body was well north of themand consequently scouted mostly in this direction.Gregg had tocross the army s line of supply and got entangled on the roads withthe Sixth Corps, moving north from the Potomac.This proved im-portant later, for when Meade became aware of Stuart s presence tothe east of the army, he sent Gregg in pursuit.Thanks at least partlyto the delay in getting clear of the army s train, Gregg ended uptrailing a day behind Stuart but never catching up with him.27 Afterthe fighting in Gettysburg got under way, Gregg was given ordersto rejoin the main army with most of his units, and he took part inthe cavalry actions on July 2 and 3.Setting the Final Stage for GettysburgThus did the two huge armies move north on roughly parallelcourses, the Union army being behind and to the south and eastof the Confederates.Hooker s intelligence was better than Lee hadcounted on, and the Union army moved more quickly than he hadexpected, so Lee had only a day or two head start on Hooker (laterMeade).For a long time, the standard accounts of Gettysburg de-scribed the clash as an accidental battle, one both sides blunderedinto in ignorance of each other s exact location and strength.Thetwo armies were portrayed as bumping into one another, with aninitial accidental skirmish developing into an all-out battle as bothsides poured in reinforcements.28 Recent scholarship has made itclear that picture is incorrect
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Tematy
IndexWarren Adler Wojna państwa Rose 01 Wojna państwa Rose
Warren Murphy Destroyer 078 Blue Smoke and Mirrors
Warren Murphy Destroyer 091 Cold Warrior
Warren Murphy Destroyer 097 Identity Crisis
Warren Murphy Destroyer 045 Spoils of war
Warren Murphy Destroyer 122 Syndicaiton Rites
Warren Murphy Destroyer 119 Fade to Black
Warren Murphy Destroyer 132 Unnatural Selection
Palmy na sniegu Luz Gabas
Into the Labyrinth Tracy Hickman