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.If I pursue this end, then I ought to act in ways whichare required by it.In my own case, this means I ought to chooseactivities I think are likely to produce my self-satisfaction.But intaking selfsatisfaction as my end, I recognize its capacity for giving Happiness, self-affirmation and God 61reasons as such, and so that I ought to further it generally and actaccordingly in the case of others.We see in this way why it is thatwe take ourselves to be under obligations to help those in need,to preserve freedom of choice, and so on.The constraining natureof the ought is a result of our incompletely rational nature, thatwe must set our ends but often fail to act in ways for which theygive reason.I may act in ways for which the overall end of myself-satisfaction offers reasons against, as when some projectedactivity puts in jeopardy an essential condition, like health, for itspursuit.But, and more commonly, I am apt to pursue my self-satisfaction as though that of others had no claim on me.Themoral ought simply articulates these wider requirements in relationto others which my taking self-satisfaction as my end, and socapable of giving me reasons, involves.Allowing the cogency of this, what are we to say about theoverall end of happiness? Since all reason-giving flows from it,it would appear that we cannot have reason for its pursuit.Nevertheless, if it is taken as our overall end, the end for ourlives as such, then we can at least ask what it is about humanlife that means it finds its appropriate end here.In describingthis end, Mackie tells us:We can& say firmly that for any individual a good life willbe made up largely of the effective pursuit of activities thathe finds worthwhile, either intrinsically, or because they aredirectly beneficial to others about whom he cares, or becausehe knows them to be instrumental in providing the means ofwell-being for himself and those closely connected with him.2The good life, as I remarked above, is one to be determined bythe individual in terms of his own satisfaction.The meaning ofhuman life is given by the individual setting his own limits:selecting certain activities of the ones which his capacities makeavailable to him, determining the degree to which they are tobe pursued and what is to count as their satisfactoryperformance.Happiness is the unhindered pursuit of suchactivities and relations within these self-set limits.But how arewe to understand the setting of these limits? They mark whatcontents me, and not momentarily, but, in so far as happiness isthe end for my life as such, in a stable and abiding way.Whatis at issue is a satisfaction of myself, one which, therefore, is 62 Kierkegaard and modern continental philosophyadequate to cope with my life as a whole.I can achieve somestable plan of this kind only if I exercise my capacities with aneye to settling on limits, and on ones which I can be reasonablyconfident that I shall find lastingly satisfying.Having determinedthese, my future is to be a continuation of my past, since it isto be organized in the light of what that has led me to believewill prove satisfying for my life.Of course, I may change mymind about this, but I shall do so, in so far as I look tohappiness as the end, in terms of arriving at some overallconception of what satisfies me through which I can then livemy life.Happiness as the end for my life as such involves acertain conception of the problem of my existence: it is one ofdiscovering through my experience a general conception of whatwill prove of lasting satisfaction which I can then use in orderto plan and relate to my future.But does this represent anadequate understanding of the problem? Nietzsche would nothave thought so.IINietzsche s thought presents a radical critique of previousphilosophy, the terms of which may well seem close to that ofKierkegaard.The metaphysical notion of truth, Nietzsche claims,presupposes a transcendent position, One would have to besituated outside of life ,3 unavailable to a living human being,yet metaphysics is itself a human activity.It is thus a particularhuman perspective on life, and one formed in terms of anillusion
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