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.Would this imply that Nietz-sche was a stoic in the wrong century? Or does an irredeemable Christ want to PAIN AND JUSTICE 79throw the promises of the Christian age, with neoclassical gestures, onto thewreckage?Dionysus versus "the you have the opposition.It isnot a difference with respect to martyrdom has a different meaning.Life itself, its eternal fertility and return, requires agony, destruction,the will to On the other hand, suffering, "thecrucified one as the innocent," functions as an objection to this life, asa formula for condemning it.One guesses: the problem is that of themeaning of suffering, whether this be a Christian meaning, or a tragicmeaning.In the former case, it is meant to be the path to a divinebeing; in the latter, being is considered divine enough to vindicate amonstrous amount of suffering.The tragic human being still affirms theharshest suffering.The Christian will negate even the happiestdestiny on earth; the god on the cross is a curse upon a cue toredeem oneself from it; the Dionysus who has been cut to pieces is apromise of life: it is eternally reborn and brought back from destruction.15, p.490)Nietzsche's doctrine of the aesthetic exoneration of life reveals itself as theopposite of a cynical aestheticism: it is grounded in an algodicy that attempts todraw pain into the immanence of a life that no longer requires redemption as anelement of the Dionysian passion.Within the Dionysian passion, which formsthe basis for every alert life, there occurs, paradoxically, that which we havecharacterized as the endurance of the unendurable.But this endurance is notwithout its digressions; rather, it has two indispensable assistants in the form ofintoxication and the oldest of drugs for elevating the psyche.Theycontribute to the formation of those intermediate worlds and realms of endura-bility that we need to keep ourselves from perishing of immediacy.Here the thesis that The Birth of Tragedy must be read as Apollonian in itsdramaturgical effect again becomes important.The book had shown how Diony-sian passion has been instructed by means of an Apollonian translation intosomething that can be looked at, imagined, and endured.In this book, Nietzscheprofesses culture, the compulsion to symbolize, representation.That this profes-sion has a double base was made just as if culture then wanted tobelong in general to the world of illusion, it would be a matter of an illusion thatdoes not permit anyone to look through it because it is the true lie of life itself.Accordingly, culture would be the fiction that we ourselves are; we exist as self-inventions of the living being that has been brought forth from the unendurabilityof the immediate Dionysian passion into a state of endurability and mediation.Life itself owes its spontaneous elevation to culture to a dialectic of what can beendured and what is unendurable, a dialectic from which the process of self-rep-resentation has sprung.From this, an ethics can be conceptualized from Nietz-sche's basic assertions that is commensurate with the universal experience of mo- 80 PAIN AND JUSTICEdernity ethics of necessary illusion, of what is endurable, of intermediateworlds; an ethics of the ecology of pleasure and pain; an ethics of ingenuous life.The concept of illusion in Nietzsche possesses a power that bridges the contra-diction between the ethical and the indeed, between the thera-peutic and theUnder Nietzsche's gaze, the world of moral and political institutions is pre-sented as a sphere of essential illusion, as a form of of collec-tive life, order to endure symbolize itself, ritualize itself,and subordinate itself to These suppositions form the Apollonian back-bone of One could (vis-a-vis his book on tragedy) compare them to whatwas initially said about Nietzsche's construction of the tragic stage: they wouldbe like these Apollonian support mechanisms, through whose efficiency a cul-turally endurable arrival of the Dionysian would become possible for the firsttime.But the normative sphere of law, mores, conventions, and institutions re-ceives its legitimation from life's compulsion toward art, not from the autonomyof a universal law of morals However, in order to remain valid, morallaw must appear in the guise of autonomy and universality.There will be noApollonian ethics without Dionysian but there can also be no Diony-sian ethics without Apollonian fictions of autonomy.This means that, afterthere can no longer be a theory of culture that is not informed by fun-damental Nietzsche did indeed shift moral and cultural-critical thoughtonto the track of naturalism, but he also broke open naturalism aesthetically andillusionistically; he localized this inventive, lying phenomenonwithin the phenomenon of life itself.Thus we see through everything that hasbeen culturally imposed to its natural basis; this basis is at the same how-ever, what ascends to the cultural and is composed into value systems.Thushuman consciousness is placed ontologically in an ironic site; one from which thepretending animal is condemned to see through his own fictions.His awakeningto this irony is at the same time an awakening to philosophy is not an ironythat could lead to detachment nor an understanding that would provide distance.At this site, the mechanism for maintaining distance from life through knowledgebreaks down.But one must play with that from which one is unable to distanceoneself.Nietzsche's algodicy therefore conceals the beginnings of a philosophicalethics ethics that clearly rests on a foundation of tragic irony.Because themoral illusion belongs to the of a naturalisticness is also not permitted to want to return to moral compositions.They belongirrevocably to the cybernetics of social beings.The Apollonian, conceived ofbernetically, signifies nothing other than the necessity of imprinting upon theamorphous compulsion of Dionysian forces and the chaotic multiplicity of theindividual a controlling form, which is ruled by the law of indi- PAIN AND JUSTICEviduality, and rationality.The concept of "justice" is a truedream of humanity, born out of the unendurability of unjust conditions: it belongsto the of life in the "intermediate worlds" of endurable ho-meostases.It is a component of the comprehensive compositions of self that werefer to as "cultures." But because everything just and all morality are to beunderstood as controlling forces in the cybernetics of the unendurable, the ironicshadow cast by the postulate of the autonomy and universality of justice willnever again be skipped over.Where values are, there ironies shall The slickApollonian belief in values and their autonomy cannot be reproduced in moder-nity.If ethics is cybernetics, we can understand why it pursues no objectives but,rather, processes It is a typically modern error to believe that ethicsmight change the world, to guarantee the Apollonian natural right to an endurablelife [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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