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.The Vilnius 10 thus looked for an opportunity to issue their ownstatement of solidarity with the United States, and their ambassadorsin Washington who meet regularly to coordinate strategy took thelead in drafting a new text in coordination with their capitals.Theywere assisted by Bruce Jackson, a former Pentagon official, Wall Streetbanker, and vice president of Lockheed Martin, who had developedclose ties to the Central and East Europeans through his leadership ofthe United States Committee to Expand NATO during the 1990s.WhiteHouse officials were aware of and supportive of the effort but did notwant to get directly involved, so it was left to Jackson who had closepolitical ties to the Bush team and often advised the Central Europeanson relations with the United States to help craft the message.132 THE TRANSATLANTIC SPLITThe Vilnius 10 text was issued on February 5.Like the Letter ofEight, it mainly stressed the signatories solidarity with the UnitedStates and their determination to enforce the Security Council resolu-tions calling for Saddam Hussein s disarmament.As former communiststates, many dominated by the Soviet Union, the leaders who signed italso insisted that their countries understood  the dangers posed bytyranny and the special responsibility of democracies to defend ourshared values.The transatlantic community, of which we are a part,must stand together to face the threat posed by the nexus of terrorismand dictators with weapons of mass destruction. It was music to theBush administration s ears, and its purpose was to make clear thatNATO s newest members would be strong supporters of the UnitedStates.The message was that it was the French and German govern-ments who were isolated, not the United States.If the Letter of Eight irritated the French and Germans, the Vilnius10 text was seen as a direct provocation, especially in Paris.Particularlyirritating to the French was the fact that the letter began with a refer-ence to Colin Powell s presentation of  compelling evidence to the UNabout Iraq s weapons of mass destruction, despite the fact that none ofthe signatories had actually seen that evidence Powell would notmake his presentation until the day after the text was finalized.In otherwords, the Vilnius 10 countries were confirming France s worst fears:that they were reflexively Atlanticist countries waiting to becomeTrojan horses for the Americans within the EU and challenge Franco-German leadership of Europe.According to his senior aides, JacquesChirac was also deeply irritated with the notion that sovereignEuropean countries, aspiring to EU membership, were taking instruc-tions from an American  lobbyist with ties to the Bush White House.Chirac took the opportunity to express himself on the subject at apress conference following an EU summit in Brussels on February 17.Ironically, the summit had just issued a statement on Iraq that wasmeant to show that members had patched up their differences and133 ALLIES AT WARagreed on a course of disarmament first and use of force as a lastresort.Chirac s statement, however, made clear that the intra-Europeanresentment had not disappeared.The EU candidates who signedthe Vilnius 10 letter, Chirac asserted, had acted  a bit lightly. After all,joining the European Union required  a minimum of consideration forothers, a minimum of policy coordination.If, when a difficult subjectcomes up, you start giving independent points of view that have notbeen coordinated with the group you want to join, well, that s not veryresponsible behavior. The Central Europeans, then, had  missed agood opportunity to keep quiet.Chirac then went on to add the warning that the behavior ofthese candidates was not only wrong, but could cost them membershipin the EU if they were not careful. Beyond the somewhat amusing orchildish aspects of the matter, Chirac said, it was:.dangerous.It should not be forgotten that a number of EUcountries will have to ratify enlargement by referendum.Andwe already know that public opinion, as always when it s a mat-ter of something new, have reservations about enlargement, notreally seeing exactly what their interest is in approving it.Obviously, then, [what the Central Europeans have done] canonly reinforce hostile public opinion sentiments among the 15and especially those who will hold a referendum.Rememberthat all it takes is for one country not to ratify by referendum,for [enlargement] not to happen [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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