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.That happened: (1) when AIPAC believedthat more could be obtained from the Congress or the administration thanIsrael had asked; (2) when supporters in Congress insisted on taking actionswithout prodding by AIPAC; or (3) when it seemed necessary to the lobby scredibility to state an independent position.Dine describes AIPAC s relationship with the government of Israel ascomparable to that of an American ambassador, trying to explain each sideto the other.He means to emphasize that he was not acting as an Israeli.The relationship is certainly more complex than that, however.When askedwho AIPAC s constituency is, Dine names three American groups: foundingJewish organizations, politically active leadership Jews and non-Jewish sup-porters of Israel, many of them Dispensationalist Christians (Dine inter-view).That response omits the government of Israel and the broaderAmerican Jewish community; yet policy could not be set nor long pursuedwithout considering the beliefs, policies and reactions of leaders of thoseentities as well as those of executive and legislative leaders.Persistentconundrums resulted for AIPAC: (1) it could not separate itself from Israeli Strength and division of the lobby 103government positions forcefully or often, or it would lose critical access tothe government of Israel and support among Israel s fiercest American sup-porters; (2) it could not wed itself to every position of the government ofIsrael without raising issues of dual loyalty or even of being an unregis-tered foreign agent; and (3) if it supported Israeli policies seen by mostAmerican Jews and American officials as antithetical to their values, itrisked its credibility and political effectiveness.When he could, Dinefocused on giving the Israeli government maximum freedom of action andsaid as little as possible about policies that were awkward to explain.Because the greatest growth in American Jewish political activism cameduring the Likud s stewardship & many new leaders were trained, educatedand indoctrinated with Likud policy (Bloomfield, in Melman and Raviv1994: 323).During the period of a National Unity Government in Israel(1984 1988), Labor leader Shimon Peres was unable to call on support fromAIPAC, regardless of whether he was premier or foreign minister (Goldberg1996: 216 18).Tom Dine says that AIPAC s identification with the Likud was much,much overrated (Dine interview).Dine did not personally support theRevisionist agenda.However, he concedes that at least one Executive Com-mittee member, Jonathan Mitchell, raised money for the Likud; and he tolda Jewish leader who raised money for left-of-center Israeli parties that heshould stop.19 AIPAC staff members, particularly Steve Rosen, were increas-ingly identified with the Likud.In 1984, Rosen treated two dovishmembers of the Israeli Knesset dismissively when they tried to explain theirviews; Rosen favored not just aggressive settlement but annexation of theWest Bank (Tivnan 1987: 207 8).20 Israeli cabinet member Yossi Sarid saidAIPAC pressured sponsors to cancel his speaking engagements; AIPACthought that my calls for an Israeli Palestinian reconciliation should not beexpressed on American soil (Melman and Raviv 1994: 327).Many events during the period 1981 1988 tested AIPAC s ability tobalance its core mission against the demands of its several constituencies.21Two will be discussed here: (1) President Reagan s 1 September 1982 planfor re-framing the peace process; and (2) the interrelated 1984 fights in Con-gress over moving the United States embassy to Jerusalem and sales ofStinger missiles to Jordan.Fresh Start: Between Reagan and BeginReagan s Fresh Start Initiative of September 1982 went beyond the CampDavid Accords by anticipating what the negotiations should lead to.22Specifically, the proposal called for self-government by Palestinians inassociation with Jordan as a preferred goal, and a freeze on Israeli settle-ments in the Territories (DoS Bull, Sep.1982: 23 5).Prime Minister Begin had not been consulted, and was infuriated by theslight as well as by the substance of the proposal.23 He obtained a cabinet 104 Strength and division of the lobbycommuniqué rejecting the plan as violating the Camp David Accords andinviting an armed Palestinian state, led by the PLO and allied with theSoviet Union (Nakhleh and Wright 1983: App.B, 137 40)
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