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.More importantly, at the insistence of theBritish, French, and Spanish,13 the debilitating clause actingin self-defence appeared just before the authorization to useforce,14 and rendered the new authorization meaningless,because UNPROFOR had always had the right to use force inself-defense.15 Permission to use force in self-defense was notsomething the Security Council needed to grant to UNPROFOR,nor could the council properly proscribe it.16 Indeed, theclause acting in self-defence could have been seen as a stepbackwards from the authority UNPROFOR already possessedbecause, from its inception, the force in Bosnia had beenallowed to use all necessary measures to assist in the deliv-ery of humanitarian aid.17 Thus, while paragraph 9 ostensiblyadded to UNPROFOR s authority to use force in Bosnia, it alsocontained a clause undermining that same authority.Paragraph 10 of Resolution 836 added airpower to the mix,but in a way that was open to conflicting interpretations.18 Itstated that Member-states, acting nationally or throughregional organizations may take.all necessary measures,through the use of air power.to support the force in theperformance of its mandate. 19 Airpower had not been specif-ically included or excluded in the paragraph authorizingUNPROFOR to use force (para.9), and UNPROFOR had no air-power of its own.This seemed to imply a division of laborwhereby UNPROFOR was only authorized to use force acting inself-defence, but NATO or indeed any individual UN memberstate acting alone or in cooperation with others could poten-tially use airpower to pursue options barred to UNPROFOR.Thefreedom to use airpower was, however, constrained in two76 NATO AIR SUPPORT AND AIR STRIKESways.First, any use of airpower had to be subject to closecoordination with the secretary-general and the Force. 20 Andsecond, the use of airpower was meant to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate set out in paragraphs 5and 9 above. 21 By requiring close coordination with the UNand linking the use of airpower to both UNPROFOR sexpanded mandate and its convoluted authority for usingforce (when acting in self-defence ), the authors of Resolution836 left open the possibility for two very different interpreta-tions of how airpower could be used in Bosnia.One way tointerpret this constraint was to give precedence to the objec-tive of the resolution protecting the people in the safe areasand to argue that airpower could be used proactively for airstrikes in order to execute the tasks spelled out in paragraph5, which UNPROFOR was proscribed from accomplishing byparagraph 9 (e.g., bombing the Bosnian Serb forces in order to promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units from around the safe areas).In addition, this first interpreta-tion would permit airpower to be used in support of UNPROFORforces when they lacked adequate means for self-defense.Alternatively, another interpretation which appealed to thoseobjecting to the widespread use of airpower was to say thatparagraph 9 of Resolution 836 clarified UNPROFOR s statusas a peacekeeping force by limiting it to the use of force onlywhen acting in self-defence. 22 Since airpower was intendedto support UNPROFOR, it could only be used legitimately forair support.Rather than resolving conflicting agendas throughcompromise, Resolution 836 merely served as a vehicle fortransferring the struggle to a new stage a stage where theatercommanders in UNPROFOR and AFSOUTH would play impor-tant roles.UNSCR 844: Implementing an Ambiguous PolicyThe ambiguity over airpower continued as the SecurityCouncil took steps to implement its safe areas policy.On 14June, Boutros Boutros-Ghali submitted a report advising theSecurity Council on the implementation of Resolution 836 inwhich he noted, NATO confirmed its willingness to offer protective air power in case of attack against UNPROFOR 2377 RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMANDMost of the references to airpower in the report dealt withclose air support for UNPROFOR, not air strikes.However, sev-eral remarks alluded to the possibility for broader air action.These included emphasis must be placed on a credible airstrike capability to help UNPROFOR resist a concentratedassault on any of the safe areas
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Tematy
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Mark Ribowsky The Supremes; A Saga of Motown Dreams, Success, and Betrayal (2010)(1)
Peter Richardson American Prophet, The Life and Work of Carey McWilliams (2005)
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