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.He was an apostle of the liberalinternationalist belief that international commerce leads to peace, prosperity, anddemocracy.Although wary of full-fledged wars, he used military force quitefrequently to stabilize far-flung trouble spots and serve humanitarian ends.ColinPowell, chastened by Vietnam, believed in using military force only sparingly,and then overwhelmingly; Clinton s secretary of state, Madeleine Albright,infuriated Powell by retorting: What s the point of having this superb militarythat you re always talking about if we can t use it? Powell later recalled, Ithought I would have an aneurysm.American GIs were not toy soldiers to bemoved around on some sort of global game board. 2In the 2000 presidential campaign Bush blasted Clinton s policies on Iraq,China, the Balkans, and the military budget, claiming that Clinton wastedAmerica s preeminent power.Soon after taking office he said never mind onall four, while neoconservatives shrieked in protest.Even Bush s earlyunilateralism was not the radical departure from recent policy that neocons,Democratic critics, and the press tended to portray.Bush rejected the KyotoProtocol on greenhouse gas emissions, but Clinton refrained from submitting itto the Senate after realizing that it had no chance of ratification.Bush advocatedmissile defense and rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, but Clintonadvocated a beginning version of missile defense and the Senate voted againstthe test ban treaty during Clinton s presidency.Bush rejected a complianceprotocol on biological weapons, but Albright allowed the protocol to languish for 206 IMPERIAL DESIGNSyears.Bush denounced the International Criminal Court, insisting thatAmericans had to be immune from prosecution, but in 1998 Clinton and DefenseSecretary William Cohen made the same argument.Clinton refused to sign thecourt authorization until December 31, 2000, which passed the ratificationproblem to Bush.Thus, there was more continuity between Clinton and the earlyBush administration than either party cared to admit; both parties magnified theirdifferences for political reasons.Bacevich later explained that stories aboutcontinuity do not sell newspapers; Kagan recalled that in any case, even Clintonwas not as European as he would later be depicted. 3But neocons like Kagan, Kristol, and Wolfowitz found Clinton incorrigiblyVenuslike for eight years, and after he was finally gone, they experienced sevenmonths of anguish with Bush.The PNAC unipolarists were rich beyond theirdreams in highranking appointments, yet frustrated, carrying out Clinton spolicies.To them, foreign policy arguments were not mere debating points forelectoral advantage.It was nice to have powerful positions, but what was thepoint if the policies and Pentagon budget didn t change? Their frustration washeightened by the fact that they dominated the foreign policy posts.So manyunipolarists swept into office that some who would have been hardliners in otheradministrations seemed like pragmatic realists.The most moderate policy makeron the second Bush administration team, State Department Director of PolicyPlanning Richard Haass, served in the first Bush administration as SeniorDirector on the National Security Council staff and Special Assistant.Haassdescribed the United States as a posse-organizing reluctant sheriff that dealtwith international crises as they emerged; America s most important leadershiprole was to rally and hold together coalitions of the willing.His model examplewas the Gulf War, for which his administrative service won the PresidentialCitizens Medal.Haass argued that America needed allies, if not alliances,because America s ability to get its own way was sure to diminish in theforeseeable future.The neocons were too ideological for his taste; they regardedhis appointment as a sop to the conservative realists in Poppy s circle.But evenHaass believed, as he put it in a speech shortly before the 2000 election, thatAmericans needed to re-conceive their global role from one of a traditionalnation-state to an imperial power. 4Haass represented the realist, and in his case, softer-edged Pax Americanism.Through the 19908 the unipolarist democratizers and realists played up theirphilosophical differences.Lawrence Kaplan counted Haas and Robert D
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Tematy
IndexJoel Fleishman The Foundation, A Great American Secret; How Private Wealth is Changing the World (2009)
Mark A. Noll, Luke E. Harlow Religion and American Politics, From the Colonial Period to the Present (2007)
William Inboden Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945 1960, The Soul of Containment (2008)
R. Murray Thomas Manitou and God, North American Indian Religions and Christian Culture (2007
Jane Elliott Popular Feminist Fiction as American Allegory, Representing National Time (2008)
Cathy J. Cohen Democracy Remixed, Black Youth and the Future of American Politics (2010)
Przemoc w rodzinie jako Âźródło zachowań agresywnych młodzieży Kwitok, Agnieszka
Cervantes Saavedra, Miguel de don quijote
Kodeks 632 Rodriques Dos Santos Jose R
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